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On May 13, 1957, about three months earlier than the United
States Supreme Court decided Roth v. Unzted States,' the Jap-
anese Supreme Court with a full bench decision 2 squarely de-
cided the constitutional validity of the provision providing for
punishment for a publisher of an obscene book.3 Since the con-
demned book in the case was the Japanese translation of the
Odessy Edition of D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover,4
there is a basis for comparison of constitutional law 5 The ap-
5 In fact, a Note on the Koyama case is seen in an issue of Law Quarterly
Review- 75 L.Q. Rev. 183 (1959).
proach taken by the Supreme Court of Japan to the same consti-
tutional issues raised in the Roth case and the standards govern-
ing censorship of obscenity are the main areas of comparison.
Article 21 of the New Constitution of Japan provides:
"Freedom of speech and all other forms of expression are guar-
* Judge of the Tokyo District Court. LL.B. Tokyo University 1950, LL.M.,
Harvard 1960.
1 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 479 (1957).
2The Supreme Court of Japan consists of fifteen justices. The Court con-
ducts hearings and renders decisions through either a full bench court or a petty
bench court. The petty benches are three in number and each consists of five
justices. Cases are at first heard by a petty bench and in the following occasions
they are to be transferred to the full bench court: (1) where the deternmnation
of the constitutionality of a low, ordinance, regulation or official act is to be made
upon the contention of a litigant, (2) where a petty bench is in opinion that a
law, ordinance, regulation or official act is unconstitutional, (3) where the opm-
ion of a petty bench concerning the interpretation and application of the Con-
stitution or any other law or ordinance is contrary to tat of a decision pre-
viously rendered by the Supreme Court, (4) where the opinion of ]ustices con-
stituting a petty bench is equally divided and (5) where a petty bench is in
opimon that it is appropnate to decide a specific case by the full bench court.
SKoyama v. State, 11 J. Sup. Ct. Cnm. 997 (1957)- J. Sup. Ct. Crim. is
an abbrevation of the Report of the Japanese Supreme Court Decisions on
Crminal Cases.
4 It must be noted that the Japanese translation of Lady Chatterley s Lover
was held to be obscene in the Koyama case. It is conceivable that the translated
edition is obscene although the original edition is not obscene. The Japanese
court did not decide the problem of whether the English edition is obscene or
not in the Koyama case.
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anteed. No censorship be maintained. " Differing from the
New Constitution, the former Constitution guaranteed only
those freedoms described "as those rights which cannot be re-
stricted unless according to the laws established by the Diet."
As a result the people could not contest the illegality of any re-
striction on the freedom of expression as long as the restrictions
were imposed by laws enacted by the Diet. While Article 175
of Penal Code making it criminal to publish an obscene publi-
cation had been existing since 1908, there had been no way to
challenge the constitutional validity of it until the New Con-
stitution became effective.
7
The primary constitutional question raised in Koyama v.
State was whether or not Article 175 of Penal Code violates
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Japan,
at the threshold of its decision, clearly recognized the differ-
ence ebtween "obscene writing" and "critical or ideological
obscenity"
Whether the sex moral and world concept advocated
by Lawrence should or should not be accepted is a ques-
tion which falls within the realm of morality, philosophy,
religion and education; and even if it could be concluded
that such ideas are nmoral and anti-educational, still
publication and distribution of his work cannot, spso facto,
be penalized under the existing laws. This is a matter
which belongs to the realm of constitutionally protected
freedom of expression and publication. The issue at hand
is whether or not the writing contains elements which
would fall within the phrase 'obscene writing as provided
in Article 175 of Penal Code.
"To be obscene," the Court declared in the opinion, "a writ-
ing in question must be such that it is harmful to the moral
feeling of shame and that it excites and stimulates sexual desire
and runs counter to good moral concepts regarding sex." And the
Court explained this definition by stating to the effect that "a
sense of shame possessed by mankind is one of the essential char-
acteristics which distinguishes human beings from the animal"
6 Article 29 of the Old Constitution.
7 The New Constitution was promulgated on Nov. 3, 1946, and became
effective May 3, 1947. Article 81 of the New Constitution provides: "The Supreme
Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of
any law, order, regulation or official act."
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and "the non-public nature of the sex act is only a natural man-
ifestation of a sense of shame deeply rooted in human nature"
and that "obscene literature excites and stimulates sexual desire
and causes man clearly to become conscious of the animal side
of him and thereby inflames a sense of shame. It is pregnant with
the danger of paralyzing man's good conscience regarding sex
and releasing it from the control of reason, causing man to be-
have licentiously and unrestrainedly, and inducing him to defy
the established concept of sex morality and order."
On the "audience problem," the Court adopted a "readers in
general" test and employed "the common concept of the com-
munity" as the touchstone for obscenity. The Court stated "this
common concept is not a conglomeration of individual percep-
tions, nor is it an average standard, but it is a collective con-
science of the community which transcends the individual per-
ceptions; and this collective conscience cannot be negated by the
fact that some persons as individuals happen to maintain con-
trary opinion." Thus the most difficult task of determining what
constitutes the common concept of the community is left to
the judges under the present judicial system." On what consti-
tutes the common concept of the community concerning ob-
scenity, the Court more concretely stated: "While the common
concept regarding sex is not the same depending on time and
place, there still exists in any society a demarcation which can-
not be overstepped and that demarcation is still being hon-
oured by the general public; this limitation is the non-public
nature of sex acts."
Since the Court recognized that the "ideological obscenity"
itself is constitutionally protected speech, we have to understand
that the opinion suggests that a book may be found to be ob-
scene, quite apart from the objectionable ideas it asserts, upon
the ground that it contains portrayals which disclose sex acts so
plainly as to shock the sense of shame of the general public.
The Supreme Court of Japan, while admitting that "the
book in question as a whole is a work of art" and "that its arus-
tic literary quality has been manifested not only throughout
the book but can also be perceived even in the descriptions of
8Under the present judicial system of Japan there is no jury at all. Both
the problems of fact and law are decided by a judge.
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the sex acts at twelve places as indicated by the prosecutor,"
strictly drew a line between a concept of art and that of obscenity
with the following statement:
Art and obscenity are concepts which belong to two
separate, distinct dimentions: and it cannot be said that
they cannot exist side by side. [T]he obscene nature
of the work cannot be denied solely for the reason that
the work in question is artistic literature. No matter
how supreme the quality of art may be, it does not neces-
sarily wipe out the stigma of obscenity Art, even art,
does not have the special privilege of presenting obscene
matters to the public. Be he an artist or a literary man,
he may not violate the duty imposed upon the general
public, the duty of respecting the feeling of shame and
humility and the law predicated upon morality
Very contrasting phrases are involved in the opinion of the Roth
case. The Supreme Court of the United States stated per Jus-
tice Brennan: "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance have the full protection of the guaranties,
unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area
of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly with-
out redeeming social importance."9 And "in its later decisions"
it is said, "the Supreme Court of the United States has found
material of even minor redeeming social importance not ob-
scene, thus indicating that it probably will assign great, perhaps
even overwhelming importance, to the aesthetic and other social
values of material caught up in obscenity charges."' 0 Under this
holding of the United States Supreme Court, a hard-core por-
nography can be suppressed, but such materials as Henry Mill-
er s Tropic of Cancer or Tropic of Capricorn"i that fall some-
where between Lady Chatterley's Lover 2 and a hard-core por-
nography, would not be.'3 However, it is unimaginable that the
9 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 479, 484 (1957).
iOLockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 96
(1960).
11 Japanese translations of Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn were
published inja an several years ago. While objectionable parts were left m
English, the Publisher was indicted under Article 175 of Penal Code. He ad-
mitted Is guilt and was tried in a summary proceeding.
12 Unexpurgated edition of Lady Chatterley s Lover was held not to be ob-
scene; Grove Press, Inc. v. Chnstenberry, 276 F 2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
S3 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 83 n.450,
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material that is obscene, though not hard-core pornography,
cannot be suppressed.
Although the Japanese Supreme Court explicitly stated that
"the obscene nature of the work cannot be denied solely for the
reason that the work in question is artistical literature," the
Court in the same opinion recognized the propriety and neces-
sity of admitting and considering experts' opinions as to the
standing of the author in literary circles and the literary value
of the writing. To admit and to consider experts' opinions seems
to be effective not only for distinguishnig material which has
literary value from pornography, which has no social value, but
also for deciding the relevancy of the specific objectionable por-
trayals to the development of the dominant theme of the ma-
terial as a whole. If the specific objectionable portrayals are not
relevant to the development of the dominant theme of a novel,
the novel, even if it has some literary value, should be protected
no more than pornography. If the specific objectionable por-
trayals are relevant to the development of the dominant theme
of a novel, should the novel be protected constitutionally? As
above mentioned, the Supreme Court took the view that "no
matter how supreme the quality of art may be, it does not neces-
sarily wipe out the stigma of obscenity." However, in the light
of its recognition of the propriety and necessity of admitting
and considering experts' opinions as to the standing of the author
in literary circles and the literary value of the writing, it seems
not to be impossible to read this phrase as implying that there
is some area where the supreme quality of art wipes out the
stigma of obscenity. In fact, the Tokyo District Court, in State
v. Ishii decided last year,14 followed the holding of the Supreme
Court that "art and obscenity are concepts which belongs to
two separate, distinct dimentions." The court, however, pointed
out the following:
However, quality of art or philosophical quality of a lit-
erature cannot be said to be absolutely irrelevant m con-
siderng the issue of whether a literary work is an obscene
one or not. A literary work involving bare portrayals of
sex act may be decided not to be obscene on the ground
that its literary quality or philosophical quality mitigates
14 In State v. Ishii, the Japanese translation of Marquis de Sade s Histore de
Julitte was held not to be obscene,
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or diminishes the effect of the objectionable portrayals.
On the contrary, there would be cases where literary qual-
ity or philosophical quality of a literary work strengthens
the effect of the objectionable portrayals of exciting or
stimulating sexual desire. In a word, literary quality or
philosophical quality of a literary work is relevant in de-
ciding the issue of whether the work is obscene or not
and the quality may be taken into account either in favor
of or against it.
As in the Roth case, the appellant in Koyama v. State con-
tended that "the phrasing of Article 21 of the Constitution
guaranteeing the freedom of expression is unconstitutional" and
that "the freedom is an absolute one and cannot be curtailed
even in the name of public welfare." On this issue, the Supreme
Court of Japan held:
Regardless of whether the constitutional provisions deal-
ing with various phases of the basic rights contain condi-
tional phrasing or not, none of the basic human rights
guaranteed by the Constitution are absolute and abuses
of them are not permissible and they may be curtailed
under Articles of 12 and 13 of the Constitution,S if en-
joyment of them interfere with the public welfare. Apply-
ing this principle to the freedom of publication and other
types of the freedom of expression, it must be admitted
that they may be restricted for the public welfare, while
we recognize the great importance of these freedoms.
There is no doubt that preserving social order of sex and
keeping mmnmum standards of morals on sex are in-
volved in a concept of public welfare.
While the Supreme Court of the United States m Roth
avoided the issue behind the phrase "clear and present danger"
by limiting the obscene materials to those which are utterly
without redeeming social importance, the Supreme Court of
Japan, as above mentioned, did not so limit obscene materials,
and took the view that "art and obscenity are concepts which
belong to two separate, distinct dimensions." The Court justi-
15 Article 12-"The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this
Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people who shall
refram from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be respon-
sible for utilizing them for the public welfare."
Article 13-"The right to- life liberty and the pursuit of happiness shall, to
the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the Supreme
Consideration in legislation and m other government affaus,"
[Vol. 51,
OBSCENITY AND THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
fled the curtailment of the freedom of expression upon the fac-
tual proposition that "obscene literature is pregnant with the
danger of paralyzing man s good conscience regarding sex and
releasing it from the control of reason, causing man to behave
licentiously and unrestamely, and inducing him to defy the es-
tablished concept of sex morality and order." This danger seems
clearly to fall short of "clear and present." However, the clear
and present danger test has not been completely foreign to the
Japanese Supreme Court. The Court explicitly or impliedly
adopted the test in deciding the constitutional validity of statutes
regulating certain political utterance16 or expression of political
opinion by demonstration.17 So, it seems that the Court distm-
guishes political utterances or expressions of political opinion
from other kinds of expression and applies the "clear and present
danger" test in deciding the constitutional validity of statutes
curtailing the former, and relies on the "dangerous tendency"
test in deciding the constitutionality of statutes regulating the
latter.
Since the readers of the Japanese translation of Lady Chat-
terley's Lover were not limited to a specific class of people, there
was no possibility for the Court to consider the appropriateness
of adopting the "Variable Obscenity" test. Also, in the above
mentioned Ishii case, the "Variable Obscenity" test was not adop-
ted, although it was alleged by the defendant publisher; it seems
that the rejection of the test was based upon the fact that the
readers of the involved book were not limited to a specific class
of people. So that, it would be safe to say that the question of
whether the Japanese courts will adopt the "Varitable Ob-
sciemty" test or not is still open.
In Japan, there has been no statute comparable to the Mich-
igan statute invalidated in Butler v. Michigan"' and the Los
Angeles ordinance invalidated in Smith v. California. Also,
there has been no statute comparable to the New York statute
validated m Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown.20 There exist sev-
eral municipal ordinances quite similar to the statute of Rhode
16 Takahashi v. State, 6 J. Sup. Ct. Cnm. 1052 (1952).17 State v. Ito, 14 J. Sup. Ct. Cnm. 1243 (1960); Yamaoka v. State, 8 J.
Sup. Ct. Cnm. 1866 (1954).18 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 880 (1957).
19 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
2 YOKingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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Island which was very recently invalidated in Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan.21 However, the effect of the action of the Com-
mission for the Protection of Youth under these ordinances is
solely to prevent the distributor of objectionable books from sell-
ing them to youth who are under eighteen years of age. The con-
stitutional validity of these ordinances has not yet been chal-
lenged.
An application of criminal sanctions is the only means adop-
ted by the National Diet for the suppression of obscene publica-
tion in Japan. In Japan, as well as in the United States, whether
"constitutionally protected expression which is often separated
from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line"22 can really
be protected or not depends on whether the criminal statute
prohibiting obscene publication is applied according to the proper
standard for judging obscenity. The above mentioned standard
for judging obscenity established by the Japanese Supreme Court
in Koyama case, I hope, would cast a light from a different angle
to the contemporary problem of obscenity and the Constitution.
21 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 31 U.S.L. Week 4192 (1963).
22 Id. at 4194.
